Waman Rao vs. Union of India (1981)

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This article is written by Kritika Garg and Naincy Mishra. This is an exhaustive article that explains the landmark judgement pronounced by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Waman Rao v. Union of India. This is an exhaustive article with respect to the evolution of the basic structure doctrine in India.

This article has been published by Shashwat Kaushik.

The Constitution of India was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 26th November, 1949, and came into force on 26th January, 1950. It is known as the supreme law of the nation. While originally it had 395 Articles arranged under 22 Parts and eight Schedules, currently the constitution has 448 Articles under 25 Parts and 12 Schedules.

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Like any other written constitution in the world, the Indian Constitution also provides for an amending power for the Parliament so that it can adjust itself according to the changing needs and circumstances of society and the nation. This amending power has been provided under Article 368 of the Indian Constitution, which includes amendment by way of addition, variation, or repealing any provision of the constitution as per the established procedure for the same. Since its adoption in 1950, the Indian Constitution has undergone several amendments every now and then. However, the power of Parliament to amend the constitution is not unlimited, and there are judicial safeguards against the same. One of the most important safeguards is that the Parliament cannot amend the constitutional provisions that form part of the ‘basic structure’ of the constitution. In this regard, various judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India highlight what constitutes the basic structure and why they must not be amended by the Parliament. In the case of Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981), while adhering to the doctrine of the basic structure, the Supreme Court laid down that the same would apply to the constitutional amendments that were enacted after 24 April, 1973 (i.e., the date of the pronouncement of the famous Kesavananda Bharati case). 

Procedure

Any law can be most effectively worked out if it can be modified so as to adapt to the changing needs and circumstances of societal needs. Similar is the case with the constitutions all over the world, which act as the most important basis to formulate law in the countries. While some constitutions are rigid, which lay down principles of permanent value and are amended only after thorough deliberations, others are flexible, in which amendments can be made rather easily. For example, the British Constitution can be amended by any ordinary Act of Parliament. 

In India, different types of provisions of the constitution are dealt differently with respect to their amendability. Three classes of amendments can be found in the Indian Constitution:

  1. The constitutional provisions, which are comparatively less significant, can be amended by a simple legislative process, as is adopted while passing any other ordinary legislation in Parliament. For these provisions, the Parliament has been empowered to make laws making such provisions as are different from what these Articles provide for. Thus, they are not subject to the special procedure laid down under Article 368. For example:
    1. Admitting a new state under Article 2 of the Indian Constitution can be affected by consequent amendments in Schedules I and IV defining territory and allocating seats in the Rajya Sabha amongst various states, respectively. 
    2. Parliament, under Article 11 of the Indian Constitution, has the power to make any provision for the acquisition and termination of citizenship in spite of Articles 5 to 10.
  2. Some vital provisions that can be amended only by following the procedure (rule of special majority) as prescribed under Article 368 of the constitution are:
    1. Introduce a bill for a constitutional amendment in either House of Parliament.
    2. The bill must be passed by each house by a majority of its total membership and a majority of at least two-thirds majority of the members of that house present and voting.
    3. The President must give assent to the bill.
  3. Some constitutional provisions that are related to the federal character, often regarded as ‘entrenched provisions’, can be amended by the same process as laid down under Article 368, with little change in the process that before being presented to the President for his assent, the bill has to be ratified also by the legislatures of at least one-half of the States by resolutions. This has been provided under clause (2) of Article 368 itself. For example:
  1. Manner of election of the President of India under Articles 54 and 55.
  2. The extent of executive power of the Union and States under Articles 73 and 162, respectively.

Article 368 vis-a-vis Article 13

Article 368(3) states that the provisions of Article 13 shall not be applicable to any amendment that is made under Article 368. Correspondingly, a clause was added to Article 13 as well, according to which the provisions of Article 13 shall not be applicable to any amendment of the constitution made under Article 368. An elaborate information with respect to the effect of these provisions has been given later in this article. 

The doctrine of basic structure can be understood as a legal principle recognised by the Supreme Court of India that identifies the core principles and values of the constitution that cannot be modified by the Parliament by way of its amending power under Article 368 of the constitution. This doctrine was established in the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) on 24 April, 1973. In this 13-judge bench decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the Parliament does not possess the authority to alter the essential structure or framework of the constitution. The doctrine of basic structure serves as a crucial safeguard against arbitrary amendments and helps to preserve the essence of the constitution.

Right after the Indian Constitution was put in place, questions have been raised about the scope of the procedure for constitutional amendment contained in Article 368. Since most of those amendments had a direct bearing on the fundamental rights of the citizens, one of the most basic questions that was raised was whether the fundamental rights could be diluted or taken away through a constitutional amendment. Thus, the constitutional validity of many of those amendments was challenged before the Supreme Court a number of times. 

Shankari Prasad Singh v. UOI (1951)

This was the first case on the question of the modification or amendability of the Indian Constitution. In this case, the validity of the First Constitutional Amendment (1951) (First Amendment) was challenged on the ground that it curtailed the right to property, which is guaranteed by Article 31 of the Indian Constitution. It was argued that Article 13, prohibiting the enactment of ‘any law that infringes or abrogates the fundamental rights’, also includes a law that amends the constitution itself. Thus, such a law could be scrutinised with respect to the fundamental rights that it tends to infringe. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this case upheld the validity of the First Amendment and limited the scope of Article 13, stating that the word ‘law’ therein does not include within its ambit a law amending the constitution that is passed under Article 368. It was further added that the word ‘law’ under Article 13 must be taken to mean ‘rules and regulations made in the exercise of ordinary legislative power’ and not amendments to the constitution, as the terms of Article 368 are very general in nature and confer the Parliament with the power to amend the constitution without any exception.

Basically, the court went with the view that fundamental rights can be violated, and that is how they are also within the reach of the constitutional amendments. 

Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965)

After Shankari Prasad, the question regarding the amendability of the fundamental rights enshrined under the constitution remained dormant for the next 13 years until it was again raised in 1964 in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965). In this case, the constitutional validity of the 17th Constitutional Amendment (1964) (17th Amendment) was challenged before the court on the ground that it adversely affected the right to property. It is important to note that by the 17th Amendment, a number of statutes affecting the right to property were placed in the Ninth Schedule and thus were immune from judicial review. 

The Supreme Court in this case reiterated the conclusion of the Shankari Prasad case and ruled that the power of constitutional amendment conferred under Article 368 could be exercised over each and every provision of the constitution. The court stated that the ‘pith and substance’ of the present amendment was only to amend the fundamental right so as to help the state legislatures to give effect to the policy of agrarian reforms.  

IC Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967)

In this case, while challenging the validity of the 17th Amendment again in a more vigorous manner, the court dealt with the question of whether a fundamental right could be abridged or taken away by the Parliament while exercising power under Article 368. This was an eleven-judge bench decision divided in a 6-5 ratio wherein the majority, while overruling the earlier decisions in Shankari Prasad as well as Sajjan Singh, held that the fundamental rights were non-amendable through the constitutional amending process under Article 368 as the fundamental rights occupy a ‘transcendental’ position in the constitution and no authority (even the Parliament while exercising its amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution) is competent to amend the fundamental rights. Accordingly, an amendment to the constitution would be considered a ‘law’ for the purposes of Article 13 of the Constitution. 

The majority expressed its concern over various amendments to the fundamental rights that had taken place since 1950 and stated that if the courts were to agree with Parliament having the power to abridge or take away the fundamental rights as up till then, a time might come when these rights would be completely eroded and India would thus gradually pass under a totalitarian regime. 

Amendment of Article 368: 24th Amendment (1971)

In an attempt to undo the effect of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s ruling in Golak Nath, the 24th Constitutional Amendment (1971) (24th Amendment) was introduced in Parliament to make certain modifications in Article 13 as well as in Article 368 to assert the Parliament’s power to amend the fundamental rights that were denied to it as a result of the Golak Nath’s ruling. Accordingly, the following changes were made:

  • A clause was added to Article 13, which declared that Article 13 shall not be applicable to any of the constitutional amendments that are made under Article 368 of the Constitution. 
  • A clause was also added to Article 368, declaring that Article 13 shall not be applicable to any constitutional amendment that is made under Article 368. 
  • The marginal note to Article 368 was changed from “Procedure for Amendment of Constitution” to “Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and Procedure therefore”.
  • A notwithstanding clause was added to Article 368 with respect to Parliament’s constituent power to amend by way of addition, variation, or repeal any provision of the constitution as per the procedure laid down therein.
  • A differentiation was sought to be made between an ‘ordinary law’ wherein the President does enjoy the power to grant or refuse his assent or refer it back for reconsideration by Parliament and ‘a law to amend the constitution’ wherein it is obligatory on the President to give his assent. 

25th Constitutional Amendment (1971)

It is worth noting that along with the 24th Amendment, the Parliament also enacted the 25th Constitutional Amendment (25th Amendment) to bring in changes in certain constitutional provisions:

  1. In Article 31(2), the word ‘compensation’ was substituted by the word ‘amount’. It was done so as to relieve the government of the obligation to provide adequate compensation for any property acquired by it.
  2. Article 19(1)(f) was delinked from Article 31(2).
  3. A new provision, namely Article 31C, was added to the constitution, which stated that:
  • Articles 14, 19, and 31 will not be applicable to a law enacted to effectuate the policy underlying clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39.
  • A declaration in the law that it has been enacted to effectuate the policy under Articles 39(b) and (c) will shield such a law from any such challenge in court.

These changes actually had far-reaching effects, as till now, the Directive Principles of State Policies (DPSPs) were treated as subservient to the fundamental rights, but after this amendment, the DPSP contained in Articles 39(b) and (c) were sought to be given precedence over the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14, 19, and 31. 

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973)

This case gave rise to one of the most landmark decisions in the history of constitutional jurisprudence in India. It is one of the most significant judgments more so because it was heard by the largest judicial bench in India, consisting of 13 Supreme Court judges. In this case, the constitutionality of both the above-mentioned constitutional amendments – 24th and 25th – was called into question via a writ petition by Swami Kesavananda Bharati, a mutt chief of Kerala. 

Some important opinions delivered by the judges in this case are as follows:

  1. The power to amend the constitution is to be found in Article 368 itself. In this regard, the ruling of the court in Golak Nath was thereby overruled. 
  2. There is a distinction between an ordinary law and a constitutional law. The constitution makers didn’t use the expression ‘law’ in Article 13 so as to include ‘constitutional law’ as that would mean conferring power to Article 368 to abridge the fundamental right or any other part of the constitution.
  3. The amending power of Parliament can’t be exercised in such a manner as to destroy the fundamental or basic features of the Constitution. Thus, any constitutional amendment that is in violation of the basic structure of the constitution is ultra vires. Some fundamental features of the constitution that are non-amendable are:
  1. Constitutional supremacy
  2. Republican and democratic forms of government
  3. The federal character of the constitution
  4. The secular nature of the constitution
  5. Separation of power between the organs of government, namely, the legislature, executive, and judiciary

4.  With regards to the amendment of a fundamental right, it is for the court to decide on a case to case basis as to which fundamental right is to be treated as a ‘basic’ feature. 

In this case, while upholding the validity of both amendments – the 24th as well as 25th – the court said that the Parliament could amend a fundamental right; however, it is subjected to the overall restriction of altering the basic structure of the constitution.

With respect to Article 31C, while the first part of the provision was held valid on the basis that it identified a limited class of legislation and exempted it from the operation of Articles 14, 19, and 31; the second part of the provision was held invalid, stating that though a law enacted to implement clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 may not be challenged under the said fundamental rights, still the courts shall have the power to go into the question of whether the impugned law does achieve the objectives inherent in Articles 39(b) and (c) or not.

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)

In this case, the validity of Clause 4 of the 39th Constitutional Amendment (1975) (39th Amendment) was challenged in court on the ground that it destroyed the basic feature of the constitution insofar as it constituted a gross interference with the judicial process. Importantly, the Amendment sought to:

  • Withdraw the election of the Prime Minister and a few other officials from the scope of the ordinary judicial process;
  • Invalidate the decision of the High Court that declared the election of Indira Gandhi to the Lok Sabha as void;
  • Exclude the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear any appeal. 

Accordingly, Clause 4 was declared unconstitutional as it violated three ‘essential features’ of the constitution, namely:

  • Democratic feature: As Article 329(b) envisages resolving an election dispute by judicial process through a petition that is presented to appropriate authority, a constitutional amendment can’t dispense with such a requirement. 
  • Principle of separation of power: As a purely juridical function, it was sought to be exercised by the legislature.
  • Equality of status and opportunity: As there was no rational justification for creating a privileged regime for the election of the Prime Minister of India.

Amendment of Article 368: 42nd Amendment (1976)

In order to ensure that the courts don’t get the power to pronounce any constitutional amendment invalid on any ground whatsoever, Article 368 was again amended by the 42nd Constitutional Amendment (1976) (42nd Amendment) to include two new clauses to the provision. 

  • As per Article 368(4), any constitutional amendment (including that of fundamental rights) made under Article 368 shall not be called in question in any court on any ground, and it is immaterial whether the amendment was made before or after the commencement of Section 55 of the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1976.
  • Moreover, as per Article 368(5), it was clarified that there shall be no limitation on the constituent power of the Parliament to amend the provisions of the constitution by way of addition, variation, or repealing under Article 368.

Minerva Mills Limited v. UOI (1980)

The scope and extent of the basic structure doctrine were again considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Minerva Mills v. UOI (1980). In this case, a petition was filed challenging the taking over of the management of the mill under the Sick Textile Undertaking (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, as well as an order made under Section 18A of the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The petitioner challenged Section 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act 1976, which inserted clauses (4) and (5) in Article 368.

The Supreme Court in this case held that Section 55 of the 42nd Amendment Act 1976 was beyond the amendment power of the Parliament. It was void as it attempted to remove the limitations upon the Parliament’s power to amend the constitution and confer such an amending power so as to damage or destroy its basic structure. It was famously stated by the court that “the donee of a limited power can’t, by the exercise of that power, convert the limited power into an unlimited one”.  

With respect to the new amendment to Article 31C, which vastly expanded its otherwise valid scope, which was also upheld under the Kesavananda Bharati, the Supreme Court said that the new extension was invalid insofar as it totally excluded challenge to any law in court on the ground that it was inconsistent with any rights given under Article 14 or 19, if it was to give effect to any DPSP. The court opined that the fundamental rights as well as the DPSPs together constitute the core of the constitution of India and combine to form its conscience; thus, the balance between the two should not be destroyed, as it will amount to destroying the very basic structure of the constitution. 

From the several judicial pronouncements, the basic features or elements of the basic structure of the Indian Constitution can be laid down as follows:

  • Supremacy of the Constitution
  • Sovereign, democratic, and republican nature of the constitution
  • Separation of power between different organs of the government, i.e., the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary
  • Federal character of the constitution
  • Secular nature of the constitution
  • Unity and integrity of the country
  • Rule of law
  • Judicial review
  • Independence of the judiciary
  • Parliamentary system 
  • Welfare state (socio-economic justice)
  • Effective access to justice
  • Freedom as well as the dignity of the individual
  • Harmony and balance between fundamental rights and the directive principles
  • Principles underlying the fundamental rights
  • Principles of equality
  • Powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32 (writ jurisdiction), 136 (jurisdiction with respect to special leave petition), 141 (binding nature of law declared by the Supreme Court on all other courts), and 142 (enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court)
  • Powers of the High Court under Articles 226 (writ jurisdiction) and 227 (power of superintendence over all courts)
  • Free and fair elections
  • Limited power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution

The present case is a 1981 judgement of the Supreme Court wherein the Hon’ble Court examined the validity of Article 31A, Article 31B, and the unamended Article 31C of the Constitution of India with respect to the doctrine of basic structure introduced under the Kesavananda Bharati case. The Court made an important observation regarding the applicability of the doctrine and held that the same should not have a retrospective effect, which means all the decisions made prior to the introduction of the doctrine shall remain valid and thus cannot be called in question. The direct effect of the decision implied that all the Acts and Regulations that were included under the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution prior to the Kesavananda decision would remain valid, while further amendments to the schedule could be challenged on the grounds of violation of the doctrine of the basic structure.

The Maharashtra Agricultural Lands Act, 1962 (Act), which imposed a ceiling on agricultural holdings in Maharashtra, was amended, and the ceiling was revised time and again. The validity of the Act was being called into question before the Bombay High Court on the grounds that it violated fundamental rights. Further, since the Act was placed under the Ninth Schedule, the constitutional validity of Articles 31A, 31B, and the unamended Article 31C (as it existed before the 42nd Amendment) was also challenged on the ground that they violated the Doctrine of Basic Structure of the Constitution. However, the High Court rejected the challenges. Another appeal was before the Supreme Court against the decision of the High Court in the case of Dattatraya Govind v. State of Maharashtra (1977). However, the Supreme Court also dismissed the appeal. Importantly, the judgement of the Supreme Court was delivered during the time when the proclamation of emergency was in effect. Therefore, after the revocation of the emergency, a new petition was filed in the Supreme Court seeking a review of the judgement passed in the Dattatraya case under the present case of Waman Rao v. Union of India. 

In the present case, the following issues were raised:

  1. Whether, by enacting Article 31A(1)(a) via the First Constitutional Amendment, the Parliament has transgressed its power of amending the constitution?
  2. Whether Article 31A(1) provides protection to the laws beyond getting challenged for violations of fundamental rights, including Articles 14, 19, and 31? 
  3. Whether Article 31B (providing for the Ninth Schedule) can be challenged for violation of fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the constitution?
  4. Whether Article 31C (aiming to achieve the goals laid down under Article 39) can be challenged on the grounds of being inconsistent with the fundamental rights of the citizens?
  5. Whether the 40th Constitutional Amendment (40th Amendment) passed during the proclamation of emergency by extending the time period of the Parliament was valid or not?
  6. Whether the “Doctrine of Stare Decisis” can be applied for upholding the constitutional validity of any Article of the Constitution or is it applicable to upholding the laws protected under those Articles of the Constitution?

The main contention made in this case was with regard to the constitutional validity of Article 31A, Article 31B, and unamended Article 31C. The petitioners contended that the protective nature of these Articles makes it impossible to challenge certain laws that are violative of certain fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. Further, the petitioners contended that the provisions of these Articles are in violation of the basic structure of the constitution as propounded in the case of Keshavnanda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). Furthermore, the petitioners challenged the 40th Amendment passed during the emergency on the ground that it was passed by extending the time period of the Parliament.

Validity of Article 31A of the Indian Constitution

Article 31A of the Constitution states that, notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law that provides for the acquisition of any estate or right by the state or the modification or extinguishment of any right shall be termed as void on the ground that it is in violation of the fundamental rights conferred under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.

While addressing the first and second issues regarding the constitutional validity of Article 31A of the Constitution, the Supreme Court observed, ‘to consider that the laws which take away or abridge the fundamental rights are laws in violation of the doctrine of the basic structure of the constitution is a misconception’. The court drew its attention towards the primary reason behind the introduction of Article 31A under the First Amendment, which was to make the Zamindari Abolition Laws more effective and to overcome the difficulties that may arise in the future. Further, the court emphasised the need for abridging the social and economic disparities in the agricultural sector, which was done by bringing the First Amendment. The court said that in the process of removing the existing inequalities, new marginal and incidental inequalities may arise. The inequalities that arose cannot infringe on the basic structure of the constitution. Furthermore, the court held that it is not possible for any government to overcome the inequalities without causing any hardship or injustice to any class of people who are entitled to equal treatment under the law. Therefore, Article 31A cannot be considered to be violative of the basic structure of the constitution.

It is important to observe that the validity of the first constitutional amendment was being questioned on six grounds in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. The State of Kerala as well. Even in that case, the amendment was upheld. Before the Kesavananda case, the amendment was called into question in three cases, namely, Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, and I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab. It is worth noting that in all these cases, the court upheld the constitutional amendment validating the inclusion of Article 31A and Article 31B.

The validity of Article 31B of the Indian Constitution

Article 31B read with the Ninth Schedule states that all the Acts falling within the ambit of the Ninth Schedule cannot be termed void for being inconsistent or in violation of the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the constitution. The law states that as and when any Act or Regulation is placed under the Ninth Schedule, it would automatically receive protection under Article 31B from being termed void for abridging the fundamental rights of the citizens. Therefore, the petitioners contended that Article 31B is inconsistent with fundamental rights. 

The court, while deciding upon the question of the constitutional validity of Article 31B, relied upon the judgement of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala and observed that before the judgement of the Kesavananda Bharati case, many Acts were placed under the Ninth Schedule on the ground that Parliament has wide powers to amend the constitution. It was only in the Kesavananda Bharati case that the court held that the Parliament cannot exercise its power to amend the constitution so as to destroy the basic structure of the constitution. Before the judgement, all the changes in the titles and properties must have occurred on the belief that the laws under the Ninth Schedule would not be open to challenge on the ground that they violate Articles 14, 19, and 31. Therefore, upsetting the settled claims and titles would be unjustified and tantamount to introducing chaos in the legal affairs of a fairly ordered society.

Thus, the court held that all the laws included in the Ninth Schedule prior to the Kesavananda case would receive the protection of Article 31B. However, the Acts and Regulations inserted in the Ninth Schedule after the Kesavananda judgement would not be protected under Article 31B and would be open to scrutiny on the grounds of being in violation of the basic structure of the constitution. 

The validity of Article 31C of the Indian Constitution

Article 31C, as discussed above, was introduced by the 25th Amendment. It provided protection to the laws specified under clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39, giving effect to the directive principles of the state. Such laws cannot be termed as void for abridging the fundamental rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution, namely Articles 14, 19, and 31. 

The contention of the petitioner regarding the constitutional validity of Article 31C was set aside for the reason that the opening clause of the Article was being upheld by the decision of the court in the judgement of Keshavnanda Bharati v. State of Kerala. The decision was based on the view that the directive principles of getting protection from Article 31C are essential for the welfare of the country and its citizens. The court further held that the said Article does not infringe the basic structure of the constitution; rather, it fortifies the same by giving effect to the directive principles contained in Clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. Therefore, Article 31C was held valid.

Validity of the 40th Amendment of the Indian Constitution

Apart from the challenges against Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C, the petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the emergency proclaimed in 1971 and 1975 and the 40th Amendment of 1976, which placed the Amending Acts 21 of 1975, 41 of 1975, and 2 of 1976 under the Ninth Schedule. The basis of the challenge was the extension of the normal term of the Lok Sabha, which was due to expire on 18th March 1976. However, it was extended twice by the House of People Amendment Act, 1976, for two years. The 40th Amendment was passed during the extended period on 2nd April, 1976. 

The petitioners contended that the court has the jurisdiction to question whether the power of the President to proclaim an emergency under Article 352 has been properly exercised or not and whether there existed such circumstances that needed the emergency to continue or not. The petitioner further contended that the emergency was proclaimed with a mala fide intention, as there was no justification for proclaiming the emergency of 1975. 

The court held that the evidence that was brought to the attention of the court was neither cogent nor sufficient. The emergency is safeguarded under Article 352(3) since it was proclaimed during a time when there was a threat to the national security and sovereignty of the country. Therefore, the steps taken were essential and, hence, lawful. 

Thus, it was ruled that the 40th Amendment cannot be struck down on the mere ground that it was passed during the emergency by extending the time period of the Lok Sabha. Hence, the amendment is valid and lawful.

The Doctrine of Stare Decisis

Deciding upon the question of whether the Doctrine of Stare Decisis could be applied to the Articles of the Constitution or if it was applicable only to the laws protected by the Articles, the court answered in favour of the latter. However, the court did not give any reasons for the same.

Further, the question of invoking the Doctrine of Stare decisis to uphold Article 31A was set aside because Article 31A was upheld on its own merits. In the previous case of Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P. (1980), the court set aside the question of whether Article 31A can be upheld by enforcing the doctrine of stare decisis to be decided in other cases. Further, the court observed that in all the cases that have been relied upon, including the Keshavnanda Bharati case, the Sajjan Singh case, the Golaknath case, and the Shankari Prasad case, none raised or decided the validity of Article 31A. The Shankari Prasad case focused on the question of whether the constitutional amendments fall within the purview of Article 13(2) or not. The decision was given in negation. Sajjan Singh’s case placed a demand for reconsideration of the Shankari Prasad judgement. The Golaknath case did not bring any constitutional amendment into question; rather, it focused on the question of where this amending power was located. Lastly, the Kesavananda case also evidently did not raise the question of the validity of Article 31A. 

The court was of the view that any judicial decision that is given after hearing an argument can be considered as a precedent, and furthermore, it becomes a stare decisis. But since the issue was not even raised in the case, it cannot be upheld by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. Furthermore, the court cited the principle that rules like Stare Decisis cannot be invoked to uphold the constitutional validity of Articles like 31A, 31B, and 31C, which not only protect past laws but future laws as well. It can be applied only to the laws protected by the Articles and not the Articles themselves. 

However, Justice Bhagwati gave a dissenting opinion and believed that the majority has upheld Article 31A by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis and not on its own merits. He believed that Article 31A was upheld in the Keshavnanda Bharati case, which binds the present decision on the grounds of stare decisis.

The decision passed by the Supreme Court in this case of Waman Rao v. Union of India is one of the landmark judgements being relied upon till date. The decision demarcated a line of difference between the Acts placed under the Ninth Schedule prior to the Kesavananda judgement and post the judgement. Also known as the ‘Doctrine of Prospective Overruling’, the court decided that all the laws placed under the Ninth Schedule prior to the Kesavananda judgement cannot be called into question for violating fundamental rights; however, the laws post the judgement can be raised before a court of law. Further, this case decided upon the questions of law, which were of utmost importance. The court upheld the validity of Article 31A and Article 31B which were introduced by the First Amendment, and unamended Article 31C, introduced under the 25th Amendment. However, the court, while dealing with the issue of the doctrine of stare decisis, did not mention any reason for its decision, which left it quite uncertain. Apart from that, this judgement is one of the most effective judgments pronounced by the Supreme Court.



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